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The November 2005 WTO decision to extend until July 2013 the obligation of the least-developed
countries to assume TRIPS obligations was clearly a decision that bowed to the inevitable: not all LDCs
were able to assume all of their TRIPS obligations as scheduled on January 1, 2006. The 2005 TRIPS
extension for LDCs is evidence of a fundamental flaw in the so-called "single undertaking" approach
of the WTO. In addition, the TRIPS extension for LDCs evidences a failure of developed countries to
make good on their promise to provide adequate technical assistance to LDCs so that the latter group
of countries would have the human and technical capacity in place to assume their various WTO legal
obligations. At the very least, the 2005 TRIPS extension evidences a lack of appreciation of the depth
of the problem facing LDCs in assuming their WTO legal obligations and becoming full members of
the multilateral trade system.
I. Introduction
As the initial transitional period for the least-developed countries (LDCs) to assume their
obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) was set to expire onJanuary 1,
2006-eleven years after the TRIPS Agreement first entered into force-the LDCs re-
ceived an eleventh-hour reprieve on November 29, 2005. Under the extension, the thirty-
two least-developed country members of the WVTO' were given an additional seven and
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1. Those thirty-two WTO members are Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Ni-
ger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zam-
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one-half years (until July 1, 2013) to provide full protection to the range of intellectual
property rights that are the subject of the TRIPS Agreement, namely, trademark, copyright,
patent, trade secrets, geographical designations, layout designs of integrated circuits, and
industrial designs, coupled with effective domestic legal mechanisms for the enforcement
of those rights against infringement.' While the November 2005 decision by the VVTO
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Council)
does not relieve LDCs of their TRIPS obligations indefinitely, it does extend the initial
transition period for LDCs under the TRIPS Agreement from eleven to eighteen and one-
half years, with further extensions possible afterJuly 2013 (the 2005 extension confirms the
right of LDCs to seek further extensions after July 2013). Such an eventuality is not out of
the realm of possibility for at least some LDCs, considering that the LDCs' October 2005
request to the TRIPS Council sought a fifteen-year extension that the Council ultimately
cut in half.3
In order to help the LDCs fully implement their TRIPS Agreement obligations, the de-
cision also reaffirms the commitment made under the TRIPS Agreement by the developed-
country members of the VWTO to provide LDCs with technical and financial assistance.
Developed countries also agreed to respond to technical capacity needs that LDCs identify
through 2007.
4
Coming on the eve of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, WTO Director-General
Pascal Lamy greeted the TRIPS Council decision with enthusiasm:
This agreement, coming just before the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, is good news....
Members have shown that they are ready to ensure that the world's poorest countries have the
flexibility that they need in order to meet their WTO obligations in a way that serves their
bia. See Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Least-developed countries, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/whatis-e/tiLe/org7-e.htm (last visited July 23, 2006). Of the eighteen LDCs that have not yet
joined the WTO, eight are in the accession process (Bhutan, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Laos, Samoa, Sudan,
Vanuatu, and Yemen) and two have observer status at the WTO (Sa6 Tom6 & Principe and Equatorial Guinea),
the first step toward WTO accession.
2. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply Intellectual
Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), available at www.wto.org/English/news-e/pres05-e/pr424-e.htm[hereinafter
Poorest Countries Given More Time]. In the discussions leading up to the decision, one of the questions raised
was whether the extension should be given on a country-by-country basis or to LDCs as a group. The TRIPS
Council's decision gives the extension to all the least-developed countries as a group. The 2005 extension
expands on an earlier extension given in 2002 for LDCs, covering patents on pharmaceutical products, that
gave LDCs until 2016 to provide full patent protection to drugs.
3. See Communication from the Delegation of Zambia on behalf of the Least-Developed CountryMembers,
Request for an Ertension of the Transitional Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, 1 2, IP/C/W/457
(Oct. 21, 2005).
4. The November 2005 TRIPS Council decision provides:
With a view to facilitating targeted technical and financial cooperation programmes, all the least-
developed country Members will provide to the Council for TRIPS, preferably by 1 January 2008, as
much information as possible on their individual priority needs for technical and financial cooperation
in order to assist them taking steps necessary to implement the TRIPS Agreement.... Developed
country Members shall provide technical and financial cooperation in favour of least-developedcountry
Members in accordance with Article 67 of the Agreement in order to effectively address the needs
identified in accordance with paragraph 2.
Decision of the Council for TRIPS, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed
Country Members, 2 (Nov. 29, 2005).
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development needs. This demonstrates what can be achieved in Hong Kong where develop-
ment is a central issue.'
At first blush the extension might indeed appear to be a magnanimous gesture on the
part of the WTO membership. But rather than being magnanimous, the decision to extend
the LDCs' obligation to assume their TRIPS Agreement commitments was instead a de-
cision that simply bowed to the inevitable. The simple fact of the matter is that all LDCs
were not ready to assume all of their TRIPS obligations on January 1, 2006, as originally
scheduled. Despite Director-General Lamy's upbeat spin on the TRIPS extension, the
extension is not cause for celebration but rather evidence that the multilateral trade system
may be failing the least-developed countries. The 2005 extension is troubling for at least
two reasons.
First, the decision exposes a troubling defect in the WTO constitution, namely, the single
undertaking approach. Under the single undertaking approach-an innovative feature of
the WTO that is enshrined in the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion6-countries joining the WTO must assume all of the obligations created under the
various VTO Agreements.7 It is a take-it-or-leave-it, one-size-fits-all approach, with all
WTO legal obligations eventually binding all WTO members, regardless of the member's
economic status. It represents a volte-face from the Tokyo Round Code i la carte plurilateral
approach that existed from 1980 until the establishment of the WITO on January 1, 1995,
where contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were free to join
all, some, or none of the side agreements (Codes) that were negotiated during the Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. But if they did not assume any of the Tokyo Round
Code obligations, then they received none of the legal benefits of the Codes. In other words,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had reverted to conditional most-favored-
nation status.
The basic rationale for rejecting the Tokyo Round a la carte approach in favor of the
Uruguay Round single undertaking approach was that the 5 la carte approach was consid-
ered a serious threat to multilateralism as it was undermining the unconditional, most-
favored-nation obligation. Despite the blow that the single undertaking approach strikes
for multilateralism, is the approach a fundamentally flawed, bankrupt concept when it comes
to the LDCs? Is it reasonable to expect that all countries, regardless of economic status,
will be able to assume all WNTO obligations, if only given sufficient time?
Article XI:2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO provides that LDCs "will only be
required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their
individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional
capabilities."' But article XI:2 does not generally relieve LDCs of their WNTO obligations.
5. Id.
6. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 11:2, 1867
U.N.T.S. 3 (1995), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-elegal-e/04-wto.pdf[hereinafterMarrakesh
Agreement]. The single undertaking approach is embodied in the following words of Article 11:2: "The agree-
ments and associated legal instruments in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 ... are integral parts of this Agreement, binding
on all Members."
7. There are two exceptions to the single undertaking approach involving two holdover agreements created
in 1979, the Agreement on Government Procurement and the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft. These
two plurilateral agreements are optional for WTO members.
8. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 6, art. XI:2.
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Indeed, what article XI:2 seems to contemplate is that the VWTO members are to lower
their expectations when it comes to the commitments and concessions that LDCs will be
expected to make in the WTO accession process and in future trade negotiations as WATO
members. Article XI:2 is not an escape clause generally relieving LDCs of their WTO
obligations. On the contrary, such a construction of article XI:2 would fly in the face of the
express provision in article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement that gave LDCs the initial eleven-
year transitional period to assume all TRIPS obligations.9
Besides exposing cracks in the single undertaking approach, the 2005 TRIPS extension
for LDCs may also reflect a failure on the part of developed countries to make good on
their promise to provide adequate technical assistance to LDCs so that the latter group of
countries would have the human and technical capacity in place to assume their TRIPS
obligations. At the very least, it evidences a lack of appreciation of the depth of the problem
facing LDCs in assuming their TRIPS obligations and becoming full members of the mul-
tilateral trade system.
Beyond exposing flaws in the WTO system's single undertaking approach, the 2005
extension may be a setback for LDCs in connection with their economic development and
their ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Granted, FDI should not be viewed
as a silver bullet or a panacea. Clearly FDI alone cannot solve all of the problems that beset
LDCs. But strong intellectual property protection is unquestionably one of the key deter-
minants of FDI, and FDI in turn is an indispensable link in the development chain. It is
unassailable that if LDCs are to diversify their economies by becoming less dependent on
agriculture and extractive industries, then they must become attractive hosts for foreign
capital. The 2005 TRIPS extension thus may further delay LDC development.
H. LDCs at the WTO
By way of backdrop, the WTO divides its membership into three broad economic groups:
developed countries, developing countries, and least-developed countries. The difference
between a developed and a developing country traditionally generally has been a matter of
uncontested self-selection.' 0 Regarding designation as a least-developed country, article
XI:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization accepts the
9. Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country Members, their economic,
financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable technological
base, such Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than Arti-
cles 3, 4 and 5, for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under paragraph I of
Article 65. The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed country
Member, accord extensions of this period.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 66.1, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEoA. INsTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
10. A challenge to such self-selection arose in the VTO accession negotiations with China, which insisted
on accession as a developing country in the services and agricultural sectors. In the end, China acceded to the
WTO as a hybrid, with treatment in some contexts the same as a developed-country Member, in other instances
on terms the same as a developing-country Member, and still in other cases on terms worse than either a
developed- or developing-country Member. See World Trade Organization, Decision of 10 November 2001,
Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001).
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Table 1.
The Fifty Least-Developed Countries
Afghanistan Congo, Dem. Rep. Madagascar Solomon Islands
Angola Djibouti Malawi Somalia
Bangladesh Equatorial Guinea Maldives Sudan
Benin Eritrea Mali Tanzania
Bhutan Ethiopia Mauritania Timor Leste
Burkina Faso Gambia Mozambique Togo
Burma Guinea Nepal Tuvalu
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Niger Uganda
Cambodia Haiti Rwanda Vanuatu
Cape Verde Kiribati Samoa Yemen
Cen. African Rep. Laos Sa6 Tom6 & Principe Zambia
Chad Lesotho Senegal
Comoros Liberia Sierra Leone
United Nations' designation of a country as least developed for purposes of the WTO
agreements." Low per capita income, weak human resources, and high economic vulner-
ability characterize the LDCs. In 2004, the fifty LDCs accounted for more than 11 percent
of the world's population (742 million people), but only 0.6 percent of the world's GDP.
Table 1 lists the fifty countries recognized by the United Nations as being least developed
as of 2005-up from forty-eight when the WTO was created in 1994.12
Thirty-five of the world's fifty LDCs are located in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 13 present-
ing an important regional case study of how the 2005 TRIPS extension might negatively
impact the region. 14
I. The Role of Agriculture in Sub-Saharan
Africa's Economy
To appreciate the formidable hurdles that confront LDCs on the road to economic de-
velopment and diversification, it is important to understand the dominant role that agri-
culture currently plays in the economies of most LDCs. Farming dominates the economies
11. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 6, art. XI:2.
12. The list is reviewed every three years by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
The criteria underlying the current list of LDCs are: (1) a low-income criterion, as measured by per capita
gross national income (GNI); (2) weak human resources, as measured by a composite index called the Aug-
mented Physical Quality of Life Index that is based on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita calorie
intake, combined primary and secondary school enrollment, and adult literacy; and (3) a low level of economic
diversification, as measured by a composite index called the Economic Diversification Index, which is based on
the share of manufacturing in GNI, the share of the labor force in industry, annual per capita commercial
energy consumption, and UNCTAD's merchandise export concentration index. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT 2004: LINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
WITH POVERTY REDUCTION at xiv, U.N. Doc. UNCTADILDC/2004, U.N. Sales No. E.04.11 .D.27 (2004)
[hereinafter UNCTAD LDC REPORT 20041. At the time of ECOSOC's 2003 review of the LDC list, the low-
income threshold for inclusion on the list was per capita GNI of $750, and the threshold for graduation was
per capita GNI of $900. See id.
13. All but nine of the SSA LDCs are WTO members.
14. Only thirteen of the forty-eight countries that make up sub-Saharan Africa are not classified as LDCs.
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Table 2.
The Role of Agriculture in SSA Economies
Percentage of Labor Force Percentage of GDP




































































Source: UNCTAD LDC REPORT 2004"
of virtually every LDC, and sub-Saharan Africa is no exception. As shown in Table 2, the
role that farming plays in the work force and the overall economies of the LDCs in sub-
Saharan Africa is significant.
With the exceptions of Cape Verde and Lesotho, agriculture employs at a minimum
more than 50 percent of the total labor force in all SSA LDCs. In the case of seven SSA
15. See UNCTAD LDC REPORT 2004, supra note 12, at 323. With regard to the percentage of GDP
attributable to agriculture for Mali, see THE EcoNoMisTr, WORLD IN FIcutRas 44 (2003).
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LDCs (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Sa6 Tom6 & Principe, Somalia, and Zambia), agriculture employs more than 60 percent of
the labor force. In the case of eleven SSA LDCs (Angola, the Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, and the United Re-
public of Tanzania), more than 70 percent of the work force is employed in agriculture. In
eight other SSA LDCs (Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique,
Niger, Rwanda), the figure is more than 80 percent. Finally, in Burkina Faso, more than
92 percent of the labor force works in agriculture. The economic dependency of these
nations on agriculture is equally striking: Twenty-seven of them are ranked among the top
forty-eight countries in terms of economic dependency on agriculture as a percentage of
GDP.16
While the structure of most developing countries' exports has shifted to manufacturing
(about 70 percent), in the case of Africa that figure is closer to 30 percent, a mere 10-
percentage-point increase over the two decades from 1980 to 2000.' 7 As Table 2 dramati-
cally illustrates, farming dominates the economies of sub-Saharan Africa, with the balance
going primarily to extractive industries. Lack of economic and export diversification is
obviously a problem for the region. A solution might be to attract FDI to the region. This
is not a call to abandon agriculture, but rather a suggestion to find ways to complement it.
Unfortunately, one prominent legacy of Africa's colonial past is the predominance of
small countries: thirty-one countries have a population of ten million or less, and most of
these less than five million. Given the importance of market size in attracting FDI, this is
a potentially significant constraint on capital inflows to the region. Greater economic in-
tegration in the region could address this demographic fact. But only 10 percent of African
trade is with other African nations, leaving a fragmented market that cannot achieve econ-
omies of scale, thus making the region a less attractive destination for foreign investment."8
Underscoring the lack of economic integration within the region, the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has observed that "the full potential of
intra-African trade has yet to be fully exploited through greater coordination of efforts
aimed at harmonizing customs procedures and reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and
at improving transport and communications links through greater investment in developing
regional infrastructure."' 9 To promote regional trade facilitation and build infrastructure,
it has been suggested that the key to sub-Saharan Africa becoming a significant player in
the global economy is for SSA countries to form one or more regional trading blocs.20
Within the region there currently are nine major free trade areas and customs unions:
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the West African Economic
and Monetary Union (WAEMU); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Southern African
16. See THE ECONOMIST, WORLD IN FIGURES 44 (2003).
17. See id. at 2-3.
18. See Eric J. Boos, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Changing Nature of U.S. and EU Development Policy
and Its Effects on the Least Developed Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181, 211
(2003).
19. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: TRADE PER-
FORMANCE AND COMMODITY DEPENDENCE 54, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2003/1, U.N. Sales No.
E.03.II.D.34 (2003).
20. See Boos, supra note 18, at 216.
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Customs Union (SACU); the East African Community (EAC); the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD); the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC); and the Com-
munaut6 Economique et Montaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC).2' The fifty-two-
member African Union, the successor to the Organization of African Unity, was launched
in July 2002, together with the African Economic Community, with lofty ambitions of
becoming an African version of the European Union, with EU-like institutions (a parlia-
ment, a commission, a court of justice, and a central bank) and with a common currency.2
But the record of existing SSA free trade areas and customs unions on integrating the
economies of their member states is at best mixed.23 Based on the region's choppy experi-
ence with free trade areas and customs unions, the merits of creating a pan-SSA trading
bloc-whether in the form of a free trade area or a customs union-are debatable. Nev-
ertheless, in view of the importance of market size to potential foreign investors, creating
fully functioning, regional free trade areas and customs unions could be instrumental in
attracting FDI. Still, when the goal is economic diversification in order to reduce over-
dependency on one or two export commodities, attracting FDI is not the same thing as
attracting the right kind of FDI.
Among the many thorny issues facing the SSA region, one is how to break out of its
over-dependency on agriculture. Attracting foreign direct investment is one obvious answer.
Table 3 shows the amount of FDI made in SSA LDCs for the five-year period 2000 to
2004. The record is not encouraging. In absolute dollar amounts, FDI in LDCs during this
period increased 280 percent-from $3.8 billion in 2000 to $10.7 billion in 2004. However,
LDCs' share of FDI as a percentage of FDI to developing countries in 2004 was 4.6 percent.
As a percentage of total FDI, LDCs' share in 2004 was a mere 1.6 percent. The year 2003
was slightly better, with LDCs receiving 6.2 percent of all FDI destined for developing
countries. But that amount was still only 1.6 percent of FDI for the world.
As Table 3 partially illustrates (the two largest recipients of FDI in the region, Nigeria
and South Africa, are not included), and as noted by UNCTAD:
Just eight countries from among these two groupings account for almost half of the total
increase in FDI flows to Africa during the period 1999-2003 over the previous six years. While
this improvement is to be welcomed, the suggestion that it anticipates a new type of growth
dynamic for the region seems implausible.2 4
In other words, FDI is spread unevenly among the countries in the region. Moreover, it
is not just FDI in the abstract that is important. Rather, it is the right mix of FDI to the
right places that is needed to ensure diversification within an economy and a gradual move-
ment away from economic dependence on one or two export commodities. As Table 3
indicates, there is an FDI bias toward mining and oil, with the largest foreign investments
in SSA LDCs going to the extractive industries of Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan."
21. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, Fourth Annual Report,
Inv. No. 332-415, at 3-1 (Pub. 3650 Dec. 2003).
22. See id.
23. For an analysis of the nine SSA regional trade arrangements, see id. at 3-3 to 3-21.
24. UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: RETHINKING THE
ROLE oF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 26 U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS.AFRICA/2005/1, U.N. Sales No.
E.05.1.D.12 (2005).
25. Id. at 34.
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Table 3.
FDI to SSA LDCs (in millions of dollars)
Annual
Country Avg.
(Year of WTO Accession) 1985-1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Angola (1996) 208 879 2,146 1,672 3,505 2,048
Benin (1996) 39 60 44 14 45 60
Burkina Faso (1995) 5 23 1 2 2 1
Burundi (1995) 2 12 0 0 0 3
Cape Verde* 6 32 9 12 14 20
Central African Rep.
(1995) 1 1 5 6 3 -13
Chad (1996) 15 115 460 924 713 478
Comoros 3 21 1 0 1 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (1997) 3 23 82 117 158 900
Djibouti (1995) 2 3 3 4 11 33
Equatorial Guinea* 17 108 945 323 1,431 1,664
Eritrea - 28 12 20 22 30
Ethiopia* 5 135 349 255 465 545
Gambia (1996) 9 44 35 43 25 60
Guinea (1995) 13 10 2 30 79 100
Guinea-Bissau (1995) 2 1 0 4 4 5
Lesotho (1995) 14 31 28 27 42 52
Liberia - 21 8 3 1 20
Madagascar (1995) 11 83 93 8 13 48
Malawi (1995) 6 26 19 6 10 16
Mali (1995) 11 82 122 244 132 180
Mauritania (1995) 7 40 92 118 214 300
Mozambique (1995) 17 139 255 348 337 132
Niger (1996) 19 8 23 2 11 20
Rwanda (1996) 11 8 4 7 5 11
Sa6 Tom6 & Principe* - 4 3 3 7 54
Senegal (1995) 18 63 32 78 52 70
Sierra Leone (1995) -8 39 10 2 3 5
Somalia 0 0 0 0 9
Sudan* 11 - 574 713 1,349 1,511
Togo (1995) 12 41 64 53 34 60
Uganda (1995) 30 181 151 203 211 237
Tanzania (1995) 30 282 467 430 527 470
Zambia (1995) 105 122 72 82 172 334
SSA LDCs 613 2,665 6,111 5,753 9,598 9,465
All LDCs 3,758 6,828 6,327 10,351 10,702
All DevelopingCountries 253,179 217,845 155,528 166,337 233,227
World 1,396,539 825,925 716,128 632,599 648,146
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005; UNCTAD Major FDI Indicators, available at http://
stats.unctad.org/FDIFrableViewer/tableView.aspx; and WTO, Understanding the WTO, Members and
Observers, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org6-e.htn.
*In the process of WTO accession or a WTO observer
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IV. Possible Fallout of the 2005 TRIPS Extension:
FDI Flows to LDCs
There are at least two potential casualties of the 2005 TRIPS extension. The first casualty
is FDI inflows to LDCs. A simple fact of life is that the demand for foreign capital greatly
exceeds its supply, creating a seller's market for FDI. Although the TRIPS Agreement does
not directly address the question of FDI, its provisions on national treatment, most favored
nation treatment, minimum standards of intellectual property protection, and domestic IP
enforcement procedures bear directly on the legal environment in which FDI operates. If
a foreign investor cannot make an investment in a host country with the assurance that its
intellectual property rights will be adequately protected from infringement, that investor
may very well decide not to make the investment. With the protections of the TRIPS
Agreement in place for patents, trademarks, and trade secrets, coupled with effective do-
mestic legal mechanisms for the enforcement of those rights against infringement within
the host country, FDI may be encouraged, especially FDI by firms with valuable intellectual
property to protect. The TRIPS Agreement thus plays a pivotal role in promoting invest-
ment and, in turn, development. 6
An overarching question, however, is this: Even if LDCs do fully implement their TRIPS
obligations, what assurances do they have that FDI will be forthcoming? Given the tre-
mendous cost, both financial and human, of building and maintaining a domestic intellec-
tual property legal regime, are the benefits of doing so worth the cost in the case of LDCs?
Clearly, there are no guarantees in this regard. Because the demand for FDI exceeds the
supply, incentives could be created to attract FDI. Investment incentives typically do not
play a fundamental role in the investment decision, compared to other factors such as
infrastructure, market size, production costs, and the skill level of the local workforce.
Nevertheless, all other things being equal, investment incentives do appear to influence
foreign investors in their investment decision."7 Investment incentives come in several
forms: (1) financial incentives (funds paid directly to the investor in the form of grants and
26. It may be important to disaggregate the various kinds of intellectual property rights when making a
claim that FDI is contingent upon strong IP protection. The only IP protection that a foreign investor may in
fact need when investing in a developing country is protection of trade secrets. As argued by Professor Paul
Heald:
[I]f a developing country does not adequately protect secret processes, devices, and know-how, or
provides no means to protect investments in training local employees by enforcing restrictive covenants,
then some kinds of foreign direct investment may be deterred. If locating in a developing country
means that valuable information or technology will be appropriated or disclosed due to poor enforce-
ment of trade secrecy or contract law, then investment decisions may be affected. The same logic,
however, does not apply to decisions to move manufacturing or research facilities to developing coun-
tries that fail to protect adequately patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
Paul J. Heald, Misreading a Canonical Work: An Analysis of Mansfield's 1994 Study, 10 J. IN.ELL. PROP. L. 309,
314 (2003). Based on corporate executive responses to an FDI-IP survey, Professor Heald concludes that:
disclosure fears-driven by inadequate trade secret or contract law-affect decisions to invest in manu-
facturing facilities or to transfer technology to the developing world. There is little support, on the
other hand, for the proposition that levels of patent, copyright, and trademark are relevant in foreign
direct investment decisions.
Id. at 316 (footnote omitted).
27. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of
Trade and Investment Liberalisation 5 (April 1998).
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subsidized loans); (2) fiscal incentives (tax holidays or exemptions from import duties on
capital goods); and (3) indirect incentives, such as subsidized services or market privileges
(e.g., the provision of infrastructure at less-than-market prices, preferential treatment in
obtaining government procurement contracts, or a monopoly position in the market).2s
Arguments have been advanced that investment incentives distort FDI inflows, just as
the use of export and import substitution subsidies distort global patterns for trade in
goods2 9 But the evidence for such distortions is not clear 30 and remains the subject of
conjecture." If developing countries in general are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis developed
countries in any investment incentive competition where an incentives package is deter-
minative in the investment location decision, then LDCs are completely hobbled in this
regard. Investment incentives can distort investment patterns in favor of developed coun-
tries simply because they have deeper pockets.2 LDCs cannot hope to compete.
A counter-argument has been made that if governments compete for FDI through in-
vestment incentives, this helps ensure that FDI goes to those places where it is most highly
valued." In defense of incentives it has also been suggested that they draw foreign invest-
ment where they help correct market failures (e.g., weak infrastructure, such as roads and
telecommunication networks). When used for this reason, incentives can be considered a
country risk premium, providing a partial counterweight to the lack of adequate infrastruc-
ture.3 4 Investment incentives have been defended on the ground that they serve as a direc-
28. See REPORT BY THE WTO SECRETARIAT: TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 21 (Oct. 16, 1996),
attached to WTO/Press Release 57 (Oct. 9, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres96-e/
pr057_e.htm [hereinafter TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT]. For a list of the main types of investment
incentives, see UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998: TRENDS AND DETERMINANTS 180 (1998) [here-
inafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998]. For an inventory of common incentives, see WTO Working Group
on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat: The Impact of Investment Incentives
and Performance Requirements on International Trade, WT/WGTI/W/56, at 6 (Sept. 30, 1998) [hereinafter Note
y the Secretariat].
29. See Patrick Low & Arvind Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished Business?, in THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 413, 414 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds. 1995)
(wherein the authors argue that as with subsidies in trade in goods, investment incentives tend to distort the
allocation of FDI).
30. See Bernard Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, Multilateral Disciplinesfor Investment-Related Policies?, World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 2138 (June 1999) (concluding that the case for initiating negotiations on
investment policies is weak).
31. See WTO Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Communication from
ASEAN, WT/WGTI/W/41, T 4 (July 3, 1998) [hereinafter Communication from ASEAN].
32. This assumes, of course, that developing countries and developed countries are in fact in competition
for the same FDI. It seems more likely that developing countries compete inter se for FDI. UNCTAD adds
that:
[e]xperience suggests that incentives do not rank high among the determinants of FDI, although their
impact on FDI locational choices is sometimes apparent at the margin .... In many instances, therefore,
incentives can be a waste of resources-something most countries can ill-afford-and, when they are
successful, can be distortional.
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGE-
MENTs 181 (1996) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996].
33. "Subsidy freedom" has been advocated in cases where incentives are effective in attracting FDI. See Eric
W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Tax Holidays as Signals, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 820-26 (1986).
34. See Communication from ASEAN, supra note 31, 8; VWTO Working Group on the Relationship
between Trade and Investment, Communication from Singapore, WT/WGTI/W/99, at 2-3 (Mar. 13, 2001)
FALL 2006
694 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
tional tool or carrot to regulate the type and nature of FDI a country receives. Finally,
investment incentives have been defended on the ground that they attract the kind of in-
vestment that leads to long-term competitiveness because along with capital comes tech-
nology transfer, managerial know-how, and ready-made access to overseas markets."
Although all host countries might mutually benefit if they voluntarily foreswore the use
of investment incentives, individual cheaters would gain from continuing to offer incentives
regardless of what other countries did. Because of this prisoner's dilemma, host countries
harm themselves by pursuing their narrow self-interest and providing incentives. When all
countries offer incentives, the incentives may simply cancel each other out, and investments
will essentially be made in the same way as if no country was offering incentives in the first
place. 36
An amended WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) that
imposes disciplines and limitations on the use of investment incentives would permit WTO
members to break out of the prisoner's dilemma, which could be especially important for
LDCs that cannot expect to outspend developed countries in any investment incentive
competition." The question is whether such an amendment would achieve the desired
result. Of course, only one country can be the recipient of a specific investment. The hope
must be that in the long run everything evens out, yet no lawyer or economist can make
such a promise and deliver on it."
Despite the arguments against using investment incentives, "[airguments on the pros and
cons of investment incentives have never been conclusive and are unlikely ever to be so."3 9
[hereinafter Communication from Singapore]; WFTO Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and
Investment, Communication from Korea, WT/WGTI/W/62, 3-4 (Oct. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Commu-
nication from Korea]. But see Note by the Secretariat, supra note 28, 18 ("If investors request a 'risk premium'
to compensate for the risk associated with macroeconomic instability, runaway inflation and exchange rate
fluctuations, the most sensible policy response would be to address these underlying problems.., rather than
to compensate investors for the poor invesonent climate."); and WTO Working Group on the Relationship
between Trade and Investment, Communication from Mexico, VWT/WGTI/W/64, 14 (Nov. 19, 1998) ("To
attract FDI it is preferable to remedy, and not to compensate for, structural or economic imperfections [through
fiscal incentives].").
35. See Communication from ASEAN, supra note 3 1, T 12. But see Communication from Korea, supra note
34, 9 8 (tax incentives have generally failed to achieve their desired effects).
36. The WTO Secretariat has explained in the following words:
[I-]ost country pursuit of the perceived first best solution-attracting investment from other coun-
tries-destroys the possibility of achieving a second best solution in which no country offers incentives,
and countries therefore end up in a third best solution with incentives being paid out, but with few, if
any, effects on investment allocation.
TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 28, at 21 n.83.
37. Modest attempts to corral investment incentives have been taken in the OECD Decision on Incentives
and Disincentives, in the Caribbean Common Market agreement on the harmonization of fiscal incentives,
and in the EU as part of its competition rules. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 32, at 181;
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Decision on International Investment Incentives
and Disincentives, Second Revised Decision of the Council, DAFFE/IME(2000)02 (May 1984). The impact
of these regional and plurilateral efforts has been limited. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996, supra note
32, at 181.
38. See James R. Markusen, Multilateral Rules on Foreign Direct Investment: The Developing Countries' Stake
53 (World Bank Study Paper, Oct. 1998), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers-2000/
jmarkusen.pdf.
39. Communication from Singapore, supra note 34, 9 13. See also Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 30, at 2
(authors conclude that regardless of whether investment incentives work or not, "there is no clear case for
international cooperation that restricts the ability of governments to pursue national policies").
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Many developing countries still dangle new ones to attract FDI.40 For them, investment
incentives remain an important policy instrument in the pursuit of development strategies .4
Moreover, because developing countries are net importers of FDI, they have little incentive
to negotiate an agreement on investment incentives unless the negotiations are expanded
to include other issues of interest to them.4 LDCs, on the other hand, because they cannot
effectively compete in the investment incentives competition, could well gain from an
amendment to the TRIMs Agreement that bans positive as well as negative TRIMs.
Considering the strong differences of opinion over the value of investment incentives,43
perhaps the appropriate response is to strengthen the capacity of governments to effectively
administer incentive programs rather than prohibit their use.- In addition, considering the
near impossibility of controlling local tax regimes through a multilateral agreement, any
international prohibitions on investment incentives could be circumvented. In sum, given
the diversity of opinion on the pros and cons of investment incentives, disciplining the use
of investment incentives anytime soon seems unlikely.
So given their limited financial resources, how can LDCs begin to compete in an inter-
national investment climate?45 Forming fully functioning regional trade arrangements where
resources could be pooled is one possibility, but this suggestion could be little more than
telling LDCs to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. Alternatively, article 66.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement clearly states that developed countries are to create incentives for tech-
nology transfer to LDCs. Developed-country preferential trade programs for developing
countries that provide duty-free treatment for exports to donor countries, including the
Generalized System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin Economic and Recovery Act, the
African Growth and Opportunity Act, and the Cotonou Agreement, could also influence
vertical FDI by encouraging investors to locate labor-intensive assembly operations in ben-
eficiary developing countries where labor costs are low. Free trade agreements between the
40. See, e.g., Pbilippines Passes Law Giving Breaks to Attract Investment by Multinationals, 16 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 2043 (Dec. 16, 1999) (multinational firms setting regional headquarters in the Philippines not subject
to income tax or value-added tax); Glen Perkinson, Indonesia Preparing Tax Breaks to Attract More Foreign
Investors, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1400 (Aug. 25, 1999).
41. See WTO Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Report (1998) of the
Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment to the General Council, WT/WGTI/2,
177 (Dec. 8, 1998).
42. See Hoekman & Saggi, supra note 30, at 2.
43. For example, the OECD's draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment specified that government sub-
sidies or advantages offered for training or employing certain workers or for constructing and expanding
facilities would not have been barred. See OECD, THE MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT (As OF 24 APRIL 1998) 22 n.29
(1998), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/40/1895712.pdf. For a brief account of the highlights of the
main provisions of the MAI and the MAI negotiating process, see WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, supra
note 28, at 65-69; UNCTAD, LESSONS FROM THE MAI 28 (1999).
44. It has been suggested that the SCM Agreement, which distinguishes between prohibited and permitted
subsidies, be used as a model for classifying and regulating investment incentives. See WTO Working Group
on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Relationship
between Trade and Investment to the General Council, WTv/WGTI/3, 9 43-45 (Oct. 22, 1999).
45. In the words of the WTO Secretariat, "[a]s competition for FDI intensifies, potential host governments
find it increasingly difficult to offer less favourable conditions for foreign investment than those offered by
competing nations." TRADE AND FoREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 28, at 21.
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developed countries and LDCs that include investment chapters with incentives could also
spur FDI.46
On the other hand, it may be unrealistic to expect that with the adoption of the TRIPS
Agreement FDI flows to LDCs will begin to significantly increase. A "build it and they will
come" mentality could cost LDCs dearly in terms of both the financial and human costs
associated with building an intellectual property legal regime and bureaucracy if there is
no payoff in the form of FDI. Even if LDCs do have strong IP protection in place, there
is evidence to suggest that other factors are equally, if not more, important than intellectual
property right (IPR) protection for facilitating technology transfer. For example, multina-
tional enterprises still invest in large, developing countries such as Brazil, China, and India,
despite the fact that IPR protection and enforcement is rather weak, presumably because
of the size of the local market.47 Technology transfer and the quality of the technology
transferred also depend upon the level of technological capability in the country. Countries
tend to acquire technology more readily if domestic firms are engaged in research. 4s This
suggests that technology transfer and diffusion will take longest in the poorest economies
that lack a sizeable local market and a well-educated local workforce. 4-
V. Possible Fallout of the 2005 TRIPS Extension:
The Rule of Law
Besides potentially discouraging FDI flows to LDCs, a second casualty of the TRIPS
postponement for LDCs may be the rule of law. ° One of the important incidental benefits
of WTO membership for many developing countries, including the LDCs, is the intro-
duction of transparency in domestic administrative and judicial proceedings dealing with
46. When it enacted the African Growth and Opportunity Act, Congress declared that free trade agreements
should be negotiated, where feasible, with interested countries in sub-Saharan Africa in order to serve as the
catalyst for increasing trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa and increasing private sector
investment in sub-Saharan Africa. See 19 U.S.C. § 3723 (2004). In November 2002, the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative's Office notified Congress of the decision to negotiate a free trade agreement with the Southern African
Customs Union, whose membership is comprised of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
Those negotiations continue as of May 2006.
47. See Sanjaya Lall & Manuel Albaladejo, Indicators of the Relative Importance of IPRs in Developing Countries,
UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 3, available at http://
www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsdseries/iprs/cs-lall.pdf.
48. See Bernard Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus, & Kamal Saggi, Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries:
Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options, World Bank Research Working Paper No. 3332 (June 2004); Keith
E. Maskus, Encouraging International Technology Transfer, UNCTAD/ICTSD Capacity Building Project on
Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development (Dec. 2003).
49. See Maskus, supra note 48.
50. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has noted the importance of the rule
of law in attracting FDI:
International rules have much to contribute to the stability of the multilateral system by helping avoid
distortions to production and trade and in promoting more stable investment flows, higher quality
investments and a better distribution of their benefits. Adherence to rules may be especially valuable
to countries whose share of international investment falls short of their needs, as well as to small and
medium-sized enterprises that might otherwise hesitate to invest outside familiar territory. Rules offer
transparency and predictability for investors, and a vehicle for international co-operation and dispute
resolution.
OECD, Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation 7 (Policy Brief Oct. 1999).
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trade laws and their administration. Domestic rules and regulations governing trade have
to be published in advance and made available upon request."1 Beyond the beneficial rule-
of-law effects derived from WTO membership in general, the TRIPS Agreement, more so
than any other WTO agreement that obligates WTO members to enact domestic legis-
lation, contains several rule-of-law provisions that bring a measure of stability, predictabil-
ity, and transparency to a country's domestic legal environment. For example, besides the
obligation to provide domestic protection for core IPRs, the TRIPS Agreement contains
twenty-five articles that require WTO members to have in place effective administrative
and judicial machinery for securing IPRs, for challenging alleged IPR infringements, and
for preventing the importation of goods that infringe IPRs. 2
Whether or not these rule-of-law provisions have a spill-over effect for other areas of
domestic law, such as commercial law or criminal law, is unclear. Nevertheless, even if
adopting TRIPS obligations does not lead to a bleed-through of transparency and due
process within a country's entire legal system, it certainly could not impede the growth of
the rule of law.
VI. Honoring Commitments Made as Part of the
Single Undertaking Approach
As an incentive to developing countries and LDCs to adopt the TRIPS Agreement and
embrace the single undertaking approach, the TRIPS Agreement dangles the carrot of
technology transfer. Developed countries made a vague promise of technology transfer in
article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which states in part that the "the protection and en-
forcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to ... dissemination of tech-
nology... ."I This hortatory goal is made mandatory in TRIPS article 66.2 which provides
that "[d]eveloped country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions
in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to
least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
technological base. ' '1 4 The TRIPS Agreement thus obligates the developed-country mem-
bers of the WTO-Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the United States-to facilitate the transfer of technology to
LDCs and to provide them with technical assistance in the preparation of domestic intel-
lectual property laws and personnel training. Technology transfer has been a frequent de-
mand of both developing and least-developed countries in the TRIPS Council.
51. The basic transparency and rule-of-law provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article
X, provides in part as follows:
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, [pertaining to
trade] shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become
acquainted with them.... 3. (a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and
reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1
of this Article.
52. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 41-63.
53. Id. art. 7.
54. Id. art. 66.2.
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Advocates of strong IPR protection argue that such protection provides an incentive for
technology transfer, such as through IP licensing." But therein lies the dilemma of the 2005
TRIPS extension: LDCs have been given another seven and one-half years to assume their
TRIPS obligations, but without strong IP protection in place they are at a competitive
disadvantage in their ability to attract FDI. In addition to mandating the transfer of tech-
nology, the TRIPS Agreement obligates developed-country members to provide technical
assistance to LDCs that will enable them to assume their TRIPS obligations in full:
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed country Members shall
provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial co-
operation in favour of developing and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation
shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and en-
forcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the prevention of their abuse, and shall
include support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies
relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel. 56
This article 67 TRIPS commitment on technical assistance was reiterated in the 2005
TRIPS Council decision, extending the transition period for LDCs. Just how well are
developed countries doing in this regard?
In February 2003 the TRIPS Council decided to monitor actions taken or planned by
developed countries under article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 7 Under the decision,
developed-country members are required to submit annual reports of their activities (full
reports every third year and updates in the intervening years), which are to be reviewed by
the Council at the end of each year. As developed countries submit their reports on the
technical assistance they have provided to LDCs, how is the value of that assistance to be
appraised? Measuring the effectiveness of developed-country technical assistance to LDCs
is both a qualitative and quantitative assessment. It isn't just a question of throwing money
at a problem, but rather carefully targeting it.
In its 2005 report to the TRIPS Council on implementation of TRIPS article 66.2, the
United States reported on general intellectual rights programs it has launched. Its activities
included a visiting scholars program and enforcement academy within the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office that is designed to foster a better understanding of international intel-
lectual property obligations and norms, to educate participants on the U.S. intellectual
property system, and to exchange information on intellectual property issues. Officials from
eighteen countries participated in 2005, but only one LDC was represented (Yemen).58 As
55. In the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration, the trade ministers of the WTO members agreed that a
working group would be set up to examine "the relationship between trade and transfer of technology and of
any possible recommendations on steps that might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to increase flows
of technology to developing countries." WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial Declaration
adopted on 14 November 2001, 9 37, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001). There are several studies on
this subject. See, e.g., G. Yang & K.E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: An Econometric Investi-
gation, 137 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHlv 58 (2001); L.E. Branstetter, R. Fisman & C.E Foley, Do Stronger
Intellectual Property Rights Increase International Technology Transfer? EmpiricalEvidence from U.S. Firm Level Panel
Data, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 11516 (July 2005), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/wl 1516.
56. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 67.
57. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Decision of the Council for TRIPS
of 19 February 2003, Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/28 (Feb. 20, 2003).
58. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Report on the Implementation
of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W/452/Add.5 (Dec. 12, 2005).
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reported by the European Union, a large number of technical training programs were held
in 2005, but very few programs targeted sub-Saharan Africa (the one notable exception is
training activities conducted by Portugal for its former colonies in the SSA region), 9
Conceding that developed countries have been providing some technical assistance to
developing countries pursuant to their TRIPS obligations, as noted in the LDCs' request
for the 2005 TRIPS extension, LDCs are nevertheless critical of the level of assistance they
have received from developed countries: "While there has been some movement in imple-
menting this commitment with some developed countries notifying to the Council for
TRIPS the technology transfers that they have been involved in, the commitment has not
yet been adequately fulfilled.-° Regardless of whether the developed countries are in fact
living up to their TRIPS commitment to provide technical assistance and to transfer tech-
nology to LDCs, it is clear that LDCs do not feel that the level of developed-country
TRIPS assistance has been adequate. If the effectiveness of technical assistance can be
measured by its results, then TRIPS technical assistance to date has not been effective, as
evidenced by the seven and one-half year extension LDCs received in 2005 to adopt the
TRIPS Agreement.
VII. Conclusion
If they are to break out of their economic dependency on agriculture and primary com-
modities, then LDCs must pursue a policy of cultivating a hospitable environment for
foreign direct investment. One of the many steps toward achieving this goal is to adopt
effective domestic legislation on IPR protection and enforcement consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement. But it would be overly simplistic, as well as inaccurate, to suggest that
the sole determinant of FDI is adequate intellectual property protection within a host coun-
try. Without the fundamentals firmly in place-political stability, desirable geographic lo-
cation, adequate infrastructure, human capacity, functioning legal institutions, enforceable
contract rights, open trade policies, and intellectual property protection-a country will
not be an attractive host site for FDI.
At the same time, developed countries must fully honor their TRIPS commitment to
provide effective technical assistance that will enable LDCs to assume their TRIPS com-
mitments sooner rather than later and thus become full-fledged WTO members. In the
process, LDCs will enhance their attractiveness as a destination for FDI and the technology
transfer that comes with it in a world with a limited supply of capital.
Article XI:2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO is not an escape hatch designed to
relieve LDCs permanently of their WTO legal obligations. But if that article is indeed a
general exception for LDCs from the single undertaking approach, then perhaps a decision
should be taken by the WTO Ministerial Conference permanently to exempt LDCs from
assuming any obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and instead to make adoption of
the Agreement optional for them. Intellectual property protection for them is at present a
one-sided proposition, given that they have little intellectual property of their own to pro-
tect. Given the uncertainty that FDI will be forthcoming even if they do assume all of their
59. See European Communities, Technical Cooperation Activities: Information from Members, IP/C/W/
426/Add.5 (Mar. 4, 2005).
60. Communication from the Delegation of Zambia, supra note 3, 6.
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TRIPS obligations, weighed against the clear human and institutional cost to them of
creating and maintaining a domestic intellectual property system, amending the TRIPS
Agreement by making it optional for the LDCs might be seriously considered, though only
as a last resort.
Is the multilateral trade system failing the LDCs? The answer has to be yes, at least in
part. The exogenous and endogenous problems facing LDCs are daunting, and not all the
blame for these problems can be laid at the feet of the WTO. Rather than play the blame
game-never a constructive exercise-efforts to fully integrate the LDCs into the ITO
system must instead be redoubled. Simply throwing up our hands and doing nothing is not
an option.
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